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Abstract
Wireless power charging enables portable devices to be permanently unplugged. Due to its low trans-
mission power and low transmission efficiency, it requires much longer time slot to charge users
compared with that for data transmission in wireless communication networks. Besides, each user’s
demand urgency needs to be taken into consideration for power allocation. Therefore, new algorithms
are essential for wireless power allocation in multi-user wireless charging networks. In this paper, this
problem is formulated as a static noncooperative game. It is shown that there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium, which is the static state of the wireless power charging network. A distributed power
allocation algorithm is proposed to compute the Nash equilibrium of the game. The main result of the
paper consists of rigorous analysis of the distributed algorithm for power allocation. The algorithm is
shown to converge to Nash equilibrium of the game with exponentially convergence rate for arbitrary
initial value with synchronous scheduling. Moreover, the distributed algorithm is also convergence
guaranteed with asynchronous scheduling under communication delay and packet drops. Numerical
simulations prove the correctness of the analysis and demonstrate the fast convergence of the algorithm
and the robustness to synchronous scheduling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication aims at providing communication freedom by bringing network to
anywhere at anytime. However, wired charging remains the main way to feed a device battery and
the battery endurance shortage has become the major bottleneck that hinders the development of
ubiquitous wireless communication systems. The cables supporting power charging has become
the only cables that would require removal.
Wireless power charging is being developed to support wireless communication systems. It is
expected that wireless power charging will play a role in future wireless networks, including the
upcoming Internet of Things systems, wireless sensor networks, RFID networks and small cell
networks. It has the potential of powering devices larger than low-power sensors and tags, e.g.,
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2wearable computing devices and smartphones. Many leading smartphone manufacturers, such as
Apple, Samsung and Huawei, have begun to release new-generation devices featured with built-in
wireless charging capability. Driven by the practical needs, wireless power charging has gained
momentum from theoretics. Existing works on wireless charging communication networks can be
categorized in two directions. The first one focuses on exclusive wireless charging, i.e., wireless
power transfer and information transmission are separated. The second direction is the research
that wireless charging and information transmission are coupled to achieve some tradeoff. In each
direction, wireless power charging has been conducted in various contexts, e.g., point-to-point
channels [1], [2], relay channels [3], [4], full duplex channels [5], [6].
In general, a wireless power charging system consists of a “transmitter” device connected
to a source of power such as mains power lines, which converts the power to a time-varying
electromagnetic field, and one or more “receiver” devices which receive the power and convert
it back to electric power. From the perspective of transmission range, wireless power charging
can be divided into near-field and far-field power charging. The far-field power charging that
utilizes diffused RF/microwave as a medium to carry radiant energy has a long history and has
recently received attention of researchers from communications society. It is shown that radio
frequency signal ambient in the air can be harvested for data transmission, and thus interference
signal plays a positive role from the wireless power charging perspective [3].
On the other hand, for the near-field wireless power charging, traditionally, transmission range
of centimeters has been realized based on the principle of electromagnetic inductive coupling.
For instance, in the Qi standard, the distance between a receiver, e.g., a mobile phone, and its
power transmitter should not exceed 4 cm [7]. More recently, to boost the efficiency of power
charging, magnetic resonant coupling (MRC) has been extensively studied which has higher
power charging efficiency as well as longer operation range up to a couple of meters. MRC
effectively avoids power leakage to non-resonant externalities and thus ensures safety to the
neighboring environment. In [8], an experiment system with multiple transmitters is successfully
delivered which can simultaneously charge a cell phone at distances of about half meter, and
work independently how the phone is oriented in user’s pocket and in [9] the authors further
prototyped charging, simultaneously, multiple devices including smart phones and tablets.
No matter for which kinds of wireless power charging technology, the number of power
transmitter is expected to be small and each transmitter needs to serve multiple users at the
same time. Thus how to allocate the charging power to different users needs to be studied
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3and is still missing. Different from the multi-user communication, multi-user wireless power
charging has its unique feature and raise new challenges. First, wireless power charging, due to
low transmission power and low transmission efficiency, takes much longer time to full charge
users compared with data transmission in wireless communication networks. Besides, the battery
capacities for each user may vary and lead to different levels of aspiration for power charging.
Therefore, with limited power at the transmitter, multi-user charging power allocation is an
important issue to be solved with consideration of different users expected amount and duration.
In this paper, we model the competition of limited charging power among users via game
theory. In general, the priority of power allocation should give to a user with low state of charge
and tight charging deadline. In order to be able to ensure at which state the multi-user wireless
charing networks will effectively operate, we provide rigourous analysis of the Nash equilibrium.
The contributions can be summarized as follows
• We propose a game framework for wireless power allocation to multiple users with different
charging needs and deadlines. Users compete for the limited power by independently sub-
mitting a unit price bid to the power transmitter, and proportional sharing of power follows
for the power allocation.
• We analyze this wireless power allocation problem using rigorous game-theoretic analysis.
We show the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for wireless power allocation.
Besides, we show for arbitrary initial values the convergence to the Nash equilibrium with
exponential rate.
• In many practical scenarios, the inter-user information exchange is asynchronous since ran-
dom data packet losses may occur, and different nodes may update at different frequencies.
These impacts are considered in computing the Nash equilibrium, which represent a general
framework including the synchronous updating as a special case.
• The power allocation algorithm takes the advantage of distributed computation [10]–[12].
The users’ charging capacity and charging deadline is not required to be shared while
computing the Nash equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the problem modeling and
formulation. Section III rigourously shows the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium,
proposes a distributed algorithm to reach the Nash equilibrium with exponentially convergence
rate, which is also robust to communication delay and packet loss. Section IV shows the
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4simulation results of distributed multi-user wireless charging power allocation. Finally, Section
V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a wireless charging server with total transition power P , which serves the charging
services of M users in the its effective charging area. V = {1, . . . ,M} denotes the set of users.
Similar to the single-input-multiple-output communication systems, the transmitter’s power is
wirelessly transferred to multiple users. Let hi be the wireless power charging efficiency to
user i, with value varying from 0 to 1, which is defined as the received power at the receiver
divided by the input power for charing i at the charging server. Note that with different types of
wireless power transmission schemes, hi has different physical meaning. More specifically, in
the MRC based wireless power charging system, hi depends on the mutual inductance between
electromagnetic coils of the transmitter and ith receiver [8]. While in the RF based wireless power
transmission schemes, hi is the product of the transmit efficiency, the free-space propagation
efficiency and the receive efficiency [4]. In the state-of-the-art, in order to improve the end-
to-end power charging efficiency, researchers efforts were focused on enhancing the wireless
power transmission efficiency via designing the non-radiated magnetic field or RF signal array
to reduce the side lobes of the beam pattern while keep its main lobe keeps spillover losses to
a minimum [9]. In the RF based wireless power transmission schemed, attaining higher receive
efficiency was also attempted through the design of high-performance rectifying antennas [13]
(i.e. rectennas), which convert the incident RF power back to DC.
In contrast to the high data transmission rate achieved in wireless communication networks,
to transmit certain amount of power for wireless charging takes much longer time due to the
limited of wireless transmission power and low wireless charging effiency. Therefore, each user
i has an expected charging period [0, Di], after Di user i has to leave the effective charging
area, and Ci is the amount of energy that is needed to fulfill i’s power consumption, such as
communication, requirement at current time. Each time, user i submits a unit price bid xi to
compete for the amount of power transmitted from the charging server, and proportional sharing
mechanism [14] applies, i.e., P is allocated to each user in proportion to their unit price bids.
Hence, the received power at user i is
yi =
xiP∑
j∈V xj
hi. (1)
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5Note that a reasonable unit price bid should be non-negative i.e.,
Si = {xi > 0}. (2)
The user’s satisfaction to the wireless charging service relies on whether the charged device can
fulfil its requirement. Hence, the satisfaction metric of each user can be defined as
si =
yi
Ci/Di
. (3)
Note that Ci/Di means the received amount of power that is able to full charge user i, which
is the expected minimum charging rate for user i. Thus, si is the ratio of the allocated power
charging rate yi with the minimum expected charging rate. The physical meaning is that if si = 1,
user i is charged with Ci within exactly charging period Di; if si > 1, it denotes that user i will
full fill the charge of Ci power within the charging time Di; and if si < 1, the charging power
rate xi can not satisfy user i’s power charging requirement within [0, Di] charging period.
In order to obtain energy from the charging server, user i needs to pay for the service.
Therefore, the utility function that user i tries to maximize can be formulated as
Ui(xi,xV\i) = si − λxi Pxi∑
j∈V xj
, i ∈ V , (4)
where xi Pxi∑
j∈V xj
denotes the payment required to obtain Pxi∑
j∈V xj
amount of power, and λ > 0
implies how to balance between the satisfaction of charging power rate and the payment. The
utility function Ui(xi,xV\i) is a measure of user i’s preference expressed by the amount of
satisfaction he or she receives minus the amount of he/she pays Note that if the urgency is
not take into consideration, i.e., λ = +∞, users would bid as low as possible to reduce their
payments. Substituting (1) and (3) into (4), the utility function is
Ui(xi,xV\i) = DiPhixi
Ci
∑
j∈V xj
− λ Px
2
i∑
j∈V xj
, i ∈ V . (5)
The multi-user wireless charging problems can then be formalized as a non-cooperative game
with the following triplet structure:
G = 〈V , {Si}i∈V , {Ui(xi,xV\i)}i∈V〉, (6)
where V denotes the game players; Si being the range of xi represents the game strategy, which
is a subset of positive real numbers; and {Ui(xi,xV\i)}i∈V is the utility function for player i. The
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6concept of a best response is central for problem formulation and analysis with game theory.
The formal definition is given as follows.
Definition 1 The best response function Fi(xV\i) of user i is the best strategy for user i given
the power allocation of the others, which is then the solution to the following maximization
problem:
Fi(xV\i) = arg max
xi
Ui(xi,xV\i). (7)
Note that for each i, the maximum is taken over xi for a fixed xV\i , [x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xM ]T .
We show in Appendix A that the best response function for user i in analytically form is
Fi(xV\i) =
[
(
∑
j∈V\i
xj)
2 +Ki
∑
j∈V\i
xj
] 1
2 −
∑
j∈V\i
xj, (8)
where Ki = DihiλCi . The best response function (8) reflects the fact that all users take independently
their best available actions in order to pursue their own individual objectives as expressed by the
particular choice of xi. Since
∑
j∈V\i xj > 0, the best response function (8) can be reformulated
as
Fi(xV\i) = Ki
[(
1 +
Ki∑
j∈V\i xj
)1/2
+ 1
]−1
, (9)
and it is evident that when some user j 6= i increases, Fi(xV\i) will decrease. This observation
indicates that what is best for one link depends in general upon actions of other links due to
the total energy constraint at the charging server. Thus, an equilibrium for the whole system is
reached when every user is unilaterally optimum, i.e., when, given the current strategies of the
others, any change in his own strategy would result in a in terms of Fi(xV\i). This equilibrium
constitutes the celebrated notion of Nash equilibrium. We define the joint best response function
as F , {F1(xV\1), . . . ,FM(xV\M)} and S = S1 × . . . ,×SM , which are a Cartesian product of
Fi(xV\i) and S1, . . . ,SM , respectively. Then the corresponding Nash equilibrium for the multi-
user wireless charging power allocation game is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2 A pure strategy profile x∗ = [x∗1, . . . , x∗M ] ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium of the game
G in (6) if x∗ = F(x∗).
In general, the game G in (6) may admit multiple equilibria. In the next section, we will prove
the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and we analyze the property of how to converge to such
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7an equilibrium in a fully distributed way [].
III. NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM ANALYSIS
A. Nash Equilibrium Analysis
In this subsection, we will show that there is always a unique Nash equilibrium for the
game G in (6) is always exists. Note that the standard interference functions introduced by
Yates [15] have been very influential on the Nash equilibrium analysis and design of distributed
power control laws for wireless communication networks. Quite a number of works [16]–[18]
has been motivated by [15] which conduct the Nash equilibrium analysis via showing that
the corresponding best response function is a standard function. While the standard function
framework is powerful, the framework does not shown the existence of fixed-points and there is
no guarantees on the rate of convergence of the iterates. Note that, recently, [19]–[21] shows that
the distributed belief propagation algorithm equals maximizing local utility function to find a
Nash equilibrium and the convergence rate is analyzed. Further, the convergence rate of a variant
of standard belief propagation is also analyzed in [22]. However, these conclusions cannot be
used in our problem due to the fact that the type of utility functions are different. Motivated by
[15] and [19]–[22], we show some unique properties of the best response function in (8) first
and then conduct the Nash equilibria and distributed computation algorithm analysis.
Property 1 The updating operator F(·) satisfies the following properties:
P 1.1: For arbitrary x,y ∈ S, x ≤ y implies F(x) ≤ F(y).
P 1.2 For arbitrary x ∈ S and α < 1, F(·) satisfies F(αx) > αF(x) and α−1F(x) > F(α−1x).
Proof 1 The proof is shown in Appendix B.
Note that Nash equilibrium does not always exist. If the set Si for all i ∈ V was a closed,
bounded, and convex subset of the one dimensional Euclidean space, and Ui(xV\i) is a strictly
concave function in S, then the noncooperative game (6) has a Nash equilibrium [23, p. 173].
This theorem is often used to check the existenceness of Nash equilibirum in literature [24]–[26].
However, Si is not a compact set as shown in (2), and traditional analysis method fails. Next
the existence of Nash equilibria is studied.
Theorem 1 The non-cooperative wireless charging game in (6) admits at least one Nash equi-
librium, i.e., x∗ = F(x∗).
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8Proof 2 Since F(·) is a continous function and considering P 1.1, F(xn) must be upper bounded
by F(+∞1) if limxV\i→∞ Fi(+∞1) exists. By substituting x(n−1)V\i = +∞1 into F(·) in (9), we
have
ui = lim
xV\i→∞
Ki[
(1 +Ki
1∑
j∈V\i x
(n−1)
j
] 1
2 + 1
=
1
2
Ki. (10)
By defining u = 1
2
K = 1
2
[K1, . . . Ki, . . . KM ]
T . we have F(x) < u for all x > 0. Then we
choose arbitrary x(0) > 1
2
K, we have x(1) = F(x(0)) < u. By repeatly applying F(·) on both
sides of the inequality we have x(n) < x(n−1). Therefore x{n} is a monotonically decreasing
sequence lower bounded by 0. According to monotonic theorem, it must converge. Thus there
exsit a fixed point x∗ which satifies x∗ = F(x∗). Thus the non-cooperative power game in (6)
admits at least one Nash equilibrium, i.e., x∗i = Fi(x∗V\i) for all i ∈ V .
It is possible that a game has multiple Nash equilibirums. Next, we show the uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium in (6).
Theorem 2 The Nash equilibrium for the non-cooperative wireless charging game in (6) is
unique.
Proof 3 The uniqueness property of the converged x(n), denoted as x∗ is proved by contradic-
tion. Suppose there are two distinct fixed points x∗ and x˜∗. Without loss of generality, there exist
i ∈ V such that x˜∗i < x∗i . It is clear that, there must exist 0 < αi < 1 such that x˜∗i = αix∗i . Let
α denote the the smallest αi for all i ∈ V , we have
αx∗ ≤ x˜∗, α < 1. (11)
Applying F(·) on (11), and considering P 1.1, we have
F(αx∗) ≤ F(x˜∗) = x˜∗, (12)
where the equality follows the definition of fixed point of x∗. Besides, as x∗j > 0 and 0 < α < 1,
following P 1.2, we have F(αx∗) > αx∗. According to (12), we obtain
x˜∗ > αx∗. (13)
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9Now we can conclude that (11) and (13) is a contradiction, and therefore x∗ and x˜∗ are the
same fixed point. Therefore, x(n) converges to a unique fixed positive value.
B. Distributed Algorithm and Convergence Analysis
In the previous subsection, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium have been
established by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, respectively. In order to compute the unique Nash
equilibrium, the charging server could gather all the users’ information together to perform
the computation. However, the parameter Ki, which depends on user i’s charging deadline and
capacity, is the privacy information of user i, and individual user may not be willing to transmit
these information to the charging server. In order to reach the Nash equilibrium of the game
without sharing individual privacy information, distributed iterative computation procedure is
preferred. In this section, we first give the synchronous updating algorithm and then analytically
prove that for arbitrary initial value of the distributed computation algorithm, the distance between
initial value and the Nash equilibrium decreases exponentially. We will also study how to choose
the initial value to make the distributed algorithm converges faster.
We introduce some preliminary definitions to provide a formal description of the distributed
computation algorithm. We assume, without any loss of generality, that the set of times at which
one or more users update their strategies is the discrete set T = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Let x(n)i with
n ∈ T denote the unit price bid of user i at the nth iteration. Hence, according to (8), the unit
price bid of user i is given by
x
(n)
i = Fi(x(n−1)V\i )
=
[
(
∑
j∈V\i
x
(n−1)
j )
2 +Ki
∑
j∈V\i
x
(n−1)
j
] 1
2 −
∑
j∈V\i
x
(n−1)
j
(14)
It is noteworthy that user i only needs to compute x(n)i with the updated x
(n−1)
j where j 6= i,
without user j sharing the privacy parameter Kj . We summarize the distributed iterative algorithm
as follows. The algorithm is started by setting user i’s bid as x(0)i . Each node i computes its
updated message according to (14) at independent time n ∈ T with its available x(n−1)V\i . Then
the joint distributed computation function is
x(n) = F(x(n−1)) , {F1(x(n−1)V\1 ), . . . ,FM(x(n−1)V\M )}. (15)
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Mathematically speaking, analyzing the Nash equilibrium of (6) equals to analyze the corre-
sponding fixed point problem of (15) [27]. It is shown in [19], [20] that if an iterative function
has some specific properties, the convergence is guaranteed and the convergence rate can be
identified. We next show the convergence property of F(·) follow the proof procedure in [19],
[20].
Theorem 3 x(n) converges to the unique Nash equilibrium x∗ of the non-cooperative wireless
charging game in (6) for any initial bids x(0) ∈ S.
Proof 4 As shown in Theorem 2, the Nash equilibrium is unique. Then the posiibility of inital
bid x(0) can be categorized into three groups: 1) the bid for each user is larger than its Nash
euilibrium, i.e., x∗ < x(0). 2) the bid for each user is smaller than its Nash euilibrium, i.e.,
x(0) < x∗. 3) some of the bid for each user is larger than its Nash euilibrium, and some of the
bid for each user is smaller than its Nash euilibrium.
1) x∗ < x(0): There exist α ≥ 1 which satisfies x(0) ≤ αx∗. Following the monotinic property, we
have x∗ = F(x∗) < F(x(0)) < F(αx∗) ≤ αF(x∗) = αx∗. Let sequence x˜(0) = αx∗ and x˜(1) =
F(x˜(0)) Then we define a new sequence {x˜(t)}. As x˜(1) = F(x˜(0)) = F(αx∗) ≤ αF(x∗) = x˜(0).
Then, x˜(1) < x˜(0) implies that x˜(t) is a monotinocally decreasing sequence. Thus x˜(t) converges.
Since x∗ is the unique fixed point, x˜(t) also converges to x∗. As x∗ < x(0) < x˜(0), F(x∗) <
F(x(0)) < F(x˜(0)). Thus x(0) with x(0) > x∗, must converges to x∗.
2) 0 < x(0) < x∗: There exist 1 > β > 0 which satisfies x˜(0) = βx(∗) < x(0). x˜(1) = F(x˜(0)) =
F(βx∗) ≥ βF(x∗) = βx∗ = x˜(0). Thus x(0) converges to x(∗) with 0 < x(0) < x∗.
3) indefinite: There exist xu and xl such that 0 < xl < x(0) < xu and 0 < xl < x∗ < xu.
Follwing case 1) lim`→∞F (`)(xu) = x∗; and Follwing case 2) lim`→∞F (`)(xu) = x∗; Thus,
lim`→∞F (`)(xu) ≤ lim`→∞F (`)(x(0)) ≤ lim`→∞F (`)(xu).
Another fundamental question is how fast the convergence would be. Define a set
C ={x(n)|xU ≥ x(n) ≥ x∗ + 1}
∪ {x(n)|x∗ − I ≥ x(n) ≥ xL},
(16)
with  > 0 being an arbitrary small value. Next, we give the definition of the part metric first, and
then show that the distance between {x(n)}n=1,... and the unique Nash equilibrium x∗ decreases
doubly exponentially fast with respect to part metric in C.
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For a proof of the fact that d(x, y) is a metric and for other properties of the part metric we
refer to [28]. Then following the proof in [19], we can show the convergence rate is doubly
exponential.
Theorem 4 With the initial bid x(0) set to be arbitrary value in S, the distance between x(n)
and x∗ decreases doubly exponentially fast with n increases.
The physical intuition of Theorem 4 is that the sequence {x(n)}l=1,... converges at a geometric
rate before x(n) enters x∗’s neighborhood, which can be chose arbitrarily small. Next we show
how to make sure the monotonic convergence.
Theorem 5 x(n) converges monotonically for any initial value x(0) > 0 if the function F(·)
satisfies {x ≥ F(x) ∪ F(x) ≥ x} 6= ∅.
Proof 5 On one hand, if x ≥ F(x) holds for some x, we can establish that x(0) ≥ F(x(0)) or
equivalently, x(0) ≥ x(1). By induction, this relationship can be extended to x(0) ≥ x(1) . . . ≥
x(n). Besides, if F(x) ≥ x holds, it implies . . . ≥ x(n) ≥ . . . ≥ x(1) ≥ x(0). Therefore,
{x|x ≥ F(x) ∪ F(x) ≥ x} 6= ∅ implies x(0) . . .x(n) must be a monotonic sequence. Since
x(n) > 0, for all n ≥ 0 and considering P 1.1, we have F(x) must within the range of F(0)
and F(+∞1). As shown in (10), we have F(+∞1) = u. On the other hand, substituting
x
(n−1)
V\i = 0 into (14), we obtain F(0) = 0. Hence, the bounded monotonic x(n) converges.
Note that to guarantee {x ≥ F(x)∪F(x) ≥ x} 6= ∅ we need to choose x(0) such that x(0) ≥
x(1) or x(1) ≥ x(0). Also, if x(0) ≥ x(1) or x(1) ≥ x(0), we have {x ≥ F(x)∪F(x) ≥ x} 6= ∅.
Thereby, Theorem 1 is equivalent to x(n) converges if x(0) ≥ x(1) or x(1) ≥ x(0) with x(0) > 0.
Hence, to guarantee the convergence in a monotonic fashion, we can simply set x(0) > [u,xU)
if u ≥ xU . Next, we will show how to choose the initial value x(0) to make x(n) converges
faster in a monotonic fashion.
Theorem 6 x(n) is convergence guaranteed with arbitrary initial value x(0) within the set
[u,xU), and with different x(0) in this range, x(n) converges to the same value. With x(0) = u,
the iteration (14) converges faster than the same iteration with any other x(0) ∈ (u,+∞).
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Proof 6 We denote by x(n) the vector sequence of (14) with initial value x(0) = u and by y(n)
the vector sequence with y(0) ∈ (u,+∞). We shall prove that
x(n) < y(n) and ||x(n) − x∗|| < ||y(n) − y∗|| (17)
for n = 0, 1, . . . ,. We prove the above results by induction. At the start, we have x(0) = u < y(0).
Assume that x(n) < y(n). According to P 1.1, we obtain x∗ ≤ x(n+1) = F(x(n)) < y(n+1) =
F(y(n+1)). Thus, (17) is proved and with x(0) = u, then the iteration (14) converges faster than
the same iteration with any other x(0) ∈ [u,+∞).
We have analyzed the convergence property of synchronous updating x(n)i for all i ∈ V . The
synchronous updating can be used in centralized computation, where all the information including
Ki for all i ∈ V are gathered in one computation centre. However, from privacy preserving
perspective, users are averse from sharing their charging capacity and charging deadline. The
distributed power allocation algorithm takes the advantage of privacy preserving. In distribueed
algorithm, the updating of x(n)i at each iteration only occurs after every user receiving updated
x
(n−1)
i from all its neighbors. However, in practice networks, due to communication packet drops
or processing delay the convergence speed of the distributed algorithm would be slow. Next, a
totally asynchronous bid updating is analyzed.
C. Asynchronous Power Allocation
With the totally asynchronous updating scheme, all the users compute their individual best
response function (8) in a totally asynchronous way. More specifically, some users are allowed
to update (8) more frequently than others with outdated information about the updated bid from
the others. For example, when node i computes x(n)i , it may only have x
(s)
j computed by other
node j with s ≤ n−1. In order to capture these asynchronous properties of message exchanges,
totally asynchronous updating has been adopted in wireless communication networks [?], [29],
[30]. Next we introduce the totally asynchronous scheduling definition and formulate the totally
asynchronous distributed best response updating.
Definition 3 Totally Asynchronous Scheduling: Let the bid available to node i from user j at
time n are xτi(n−1)j , with τi(n − 1) satisfying 0 ≤ τi(n − 1) ≤ n and lim
n→∞
τi(n) = ∞ for all
i = 1, ...,M .
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According to Definition 3, the asynchronous updating version of (14) can be expressed as
x
(n)
i = Fi(xτi(n−1)V\i )
=
[
(
∑
j∈V\i
x
τi(n−1)
j )
2 +Ki
∑
j∈V\i
x
τi(n−1)
j
] 1
2
−
∑
j∈V\i
x
τi(n−1)
j . (18)
Note that x(n)i is the outgoing information from user i, the corresponding avaiable bid used for
computation at user j is denoted by xτj(n−1)i . and x
τi(n−1)
V\i = [x
τi(n−1)
1 , . . . , x
τi(n−1)
i−1 , x
τi(n−1)
i+1 , . . . , x
τi(n−1)
M ]
T .
The synchronous version of (14) is a special case of asynchronous updating in (14) without
considering the possible information loss due to communications and different user may have
different updating frequencies. Suppose user i only update and the time instance Ti, then the
outgoing information is
x
(n)
i =
 Fi(x
τi(n−1)
V\i ), if n ∈ Ti
x
(n)
i , otherwise.
(19)
Following the same arguments in the proof of Theorem 1, we have the following convergence
properties for the asynchronous updating.
Corollary 1 With the asynchronous updating as in (19), x(n) is convergence guaranteed for any
initial value x(0) ∈ S.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section provides simulation results on the tests of the developed synchronous and asyn-
chronous distributed multi-user wireless charging power allocation algorithms proposed in Sec-
tion III. The related wireless charging parameters are generated according to a wireless charging
prototype in [9] which charges users iPhone 4s based on MRC method. More specifically, for
different users, the received power Ci
Di
varies within R = [1, 3]W The corresponding power
transmission efficiency hi, according to the experiment results is varies within H = [11%, 19%].
The input power P is set to be 20W, which is the mean of standardized wireless charging
product including Duracell Powermat, Energizer Qi, LUXA2 and WiTricity WiT-500. Note that,
with charging methods based on different wireless power charging principle, such as MRC, RF
energy transfer and inductive coupling [31], the charging efficiency hi is different. Besides, each
user may require different amount of energy Ci to fulfill their devices and have different expected
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charging time Di. Thus there may be different methods to set these simulation parameters.
However, the proposed distributed multi-user charging power allocation algorithm and Nash
equilibrium analysis is adapt to different charging methods and users. For the asynchronous
updating, the probability of user i successfully pass x(n)i to user j is pi,j , with pi,j ≤ 1. Therefore,
pi,j emulate the asynchronous network due to packet loss or communicating delay. The weighting
parameter λ is set to be 1 without specification.
Fig. 1 shows the convergence behavior of the proposed algorithms for computing the Nash
equilibrium x∗i . Two users compete for the wireless power charging is considered. Ci/Di for i =
1, 2 are randomly picked up from R. It is assumed there is no packet loss nor any communication
delay, thus p1,2 = p2,1 = 1. We start the distributed synchronous updating algorithm with different
values. It shows in Fig. 1 that each user’s x(n)i converges to the unique Nash equilibrium within
4 iterations. Moreover, Fig. 2 shows the convergence property for asynchronous scheduling with
the same parameter set up but a successfully communication probability p1,2 = p2,1 = 0.8. It
can be seen that: The distributed approach converges still very rapidly and after convergence the
corresponding Nash equilibrium is unique.
Fig. 3 shows the relationship between iteration number upon convergence versus the network
size for both synchronous and asynchronous scheduling (pi,j = 0.8). It is shown that for both
cases, the the iteration number increases slightly when the network size increases. The slow
increase of iteration number is due to the exponential convergence rate as shown in Theorem
4. Thus for different network sizes, the iteration number is quite small and almost the same.
Fig. 3 also shows with pi,j = 0.8, the relationship between iteration number upon convergence
versus the network size under asynchronous updating. It can be seen that even with 20% chance
of packet loss between each pair of users, the asynchronous algorithm can still reach the Nash
equilibrium quickly. Moreover, the computational complexity for the distributed power allocation
algorithm is quite low since for each iteration, the computation for the unit price bid x(n)i in
(14) only involves serval scalar multiplications.
In Figure 4, we show the Nash equilibrium with respect to the number of users M . For each
case all the parameters are set to be the same for a fair comparison. For each user, Ci/Di is set
to be 1.2. It is demonstrated that the Nash equilibrium for each user x∗i monotonically increases
as M increases. This is due to the completion among the users gradually become more severe
such that the bid offered by each user at the equilibrium also increases.
Next we demonstrate the social welfare behavior of wireless charging user. The social welfare
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Fig. 1. Convergence performance of the proposed algorithm for different initial values with synchronous scheduling.
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Fig. 2. Convergence performance of the proposed algorithm for different initial values with asynchronous scheduling.
of the users is defined as
U(x∗) =
M∑
i=1
Ui(x∗i ,x∗V\i)
=
M∑
i=1
DiPhix
∗
i
Ci
∑
j∈V x
∗
j
− λ P (x
∗
i )
2∑
j∈V x
∗
j
.
For each fixed user number, Ci/Di are uniformly generated from R and hi is uniformly generated
from D. Each point in the figure is an average of 1000 times simulation. First, Figure 5 shows
that the social welfare of the users monotonically decreases for the reason of the increasing
competition among the users, which implies the increasing social welfare of the charging server.
Second, if as the portion of urgency in the utility function decreases the utility function is
increases.
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Fig. 4. Convergence to the Nash equilibrium solution x∗i with respect to different number of users. (ratio = 0.7, asynchronous
0.2 success)
The efficiency of a noncooperative game is defined as the ratio of the highest value of the
social welfare to the worse Nash equilibrium of the game. By assuming users are cooperative,
the highest value of the social welfare is computed by
xP = [xP1 , . . . x
P
M ] = argmin
x
M∑
i=1
Ui(xi,xV\i). (20)
Besides, since we have shown in Theorem 2 that there is a unique Nash equilibrium in G, the
price of anarchy of the game G is
PoA =
∑M
i=1 Ui(xPi ,xPV\i)∑M
i=1 Ui(x∗i ,x∗V\i)
. (21)
Figure 6 shows that the price of anarchy increases slowly with the number of users which implies
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Fig. 6. Price of anarchy with respect to the number of users.
the social welfare gap between cooperative optimal and noncooperative optimal increases slowly.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a fully distributed multi-user wireless charging power allocation scheme has been
proposed. It has taken into consideration of the impact of charging time on the power allocating
problem. The proposed distributed algorithm only involves limited information exchanges among
users and avoids sharing privacy information as in the centralized algorithm. We have presented
a rigorous analysis for the existence and unique of the Nash equilibrium for both synchronous
and asynchronous updating. Moreover, we have proved that the distributed algorithm converges
with a exponential rate. Simulations have verified the theatrical analysis and shown the efficiency
of the power allocation algorithm.
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APPENDIX A
By taking the second derivative of Ui(xi,xV\i) in (20) with respect to xi, we obtain
∂2Ui(xi,xV\i)
∂x2i
=− 2DiPhi
∑
j∈V\i xj
Ci(
∑
j∈V xj)
3
− 2λP (
∑
j∈V\i xj)
2
Ci(
∑
j∈V xj)
3
.
(22)
As xj > 0 for all j ∈ V , it is clear that ∂2Ui(xi,xV\i)/∂x2i < 0. Therefore, the utility function
Ui(xi,xV\i) is strictly concave, and the best response function, according to Definition 1, can
be obtained by setting the first derivative of Ui(xi,xV\i) to be zero, i.e.,
∂Ui(xi,xV\i)
∂xi
=
DiPhi
Ci
∑
j∈V\i xj
(
∑
j∈V xj)
2
− λP x
2
i + 2xi
∑
j∈V\i xj
(
∑
j∈V xj)
2
= 0.
(23)
After some algebraic manipulations, the best response function for user i can be readily given
by
Fi(xV\i) =
[
(
∑
j∈V\i
xj)
2 +Ki
∑
j∈V\i
xj
] 1
2 −
∑
j∈V\i
xj, (24)
where Ki = DihiλCi .
APPENDIX B
By taking the first-order derivative of Fi(xV\i) in (8) with respect to xi, we obtain
∂Fi(xV\i)
∂xi
=
∑
j∈V\i xj +
1
2
Ki[
(
∑
j∈V\i xj)
2 +Ki
∑
j∈V\i xj
] 1
2
− 1. (25)
After performing some algebraic manipulations, the numerator of (25) can be reformulated as∑
j∈V\i
xj +
1
2
Ki
= [(
∑
j∈V\i
xj)
2 +Ki
∑
j∈V\i
xj + (
1
2
Ki)
2]1/2. (26)
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Therefore, ∑
j∈V\i
xj +
1
2
Ki > [(
∑
j∈V\i
xj)
2 +
1
2
Ki
∑
j∈V\i
xj]
1/2, (27)
and hence, it is clear that ∂Fi(xV\i)
∂xi
> 0. Thus, Fi(·) or equivalently, F(·) satisfies that x ≥ y
implies F(x) ≥ F(y).
Next, we will show P 1.2. For arbitrary x ∈ S and α < 1, it can be shown that[
(
∑
j∈V\i
αxj)
2 +Ki
∑
j∈V\i
αxj
] 1
2 −
∑
j∈V\i
αxj
>
[
(
∑
j∈V\i
αxj)
2 +Ki
∑
j∈V\i
α2xj
] 1
2 −
∑
j∈V\i
αxj.
(28)
Thus, by the definition of Fi(·), (28) implies Fi(αxV\i) > αFi(xV\i) = αxV\i. Thus we have
F(αx) > αF(x). With similar argument, we can also show that α−1F(x) > F(α−1x).
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